By Chris Osa Nehikhare | Publisher, From My Window

Thirty-three more cars for judges. But what happened to judicial financial autonomy?

There is something about the Edo State Government and the procurement of vehicles that is beginning to deserve its own chapter in the state’s public expenditure history.

Hardly does an opportunity present itself without the announcement of another vehicle procurement initiative.

The latest beneficiaries, we are told, will be the judges of Edo State.

During a recent courtesy visit by the Chief Judge of Edo State, Justice Daniel Iyobosa Okungbowa, to Governor Monday Okpebholo, ostensibly to invite the Governor to activities marking the commencement of the 2026/2027 Legal Year, the Governor announced that the State Executive Council had approved the purchase of approximately 33 vehicles to replace those currently being used by judges.

Thirty-three vehicles!

One might ordinarily welcome any initiative designed to improve the working conditions of our judicial officers. Judges perform an indispensable constitutional function, and their welfare, security and mobility should never be treated as luxuries.

But the announcement raises a rather interesting question.

Why is the Edo State Executive purchasing vehicles for a judiciary that enjoys constitutionally guaranteed financial autonomy?

Asking for a friend!

Judicial Autonomy: More Than a Constitutional Decoration
Section 121(3) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), provides for funds standing to the credit of the judiciary in the State Consolidated Revenue Fund to be paid directly to the heads of the courts concerned.

The intention is straightforward: to protect the judiciary from undue financial dependence on the executive arm of government.

Judicial independence is not limited to the freedom to deliver judgments without interference. It also requires sufficient institutional control over the resources necessary to administer justice.

A judiciary that must continually approach the executive for vehicles, equipment and other essential requirements risks becoming administratively dependent, even where its constitutional independence remains formally recognised.

This is not to suggest that the Governor has committed any constitutional violation by proposing to provide vehicles.

The state has legitimate responsibilities in funding the administration of justice, and cooperation between the executive and judiciary is both necessary and desirable.

However, cooperation must not become a substitute for autonomy.

If the judiciary has its own approved budget, should the procurement of official vehicles not ordinarily be planned, prioritised and administered through its appropriate institutional structures?

Was this purchase requested by the judiciary? Is it provided for in the judiciary’s approved budget? Will the judiciary control the procurement process, or will the executive purchase the vehicles and subsequently present them as a gesture of goodwill?

These distinctions matter.

But Didn’t We Buy Vehicles Recently?
There is another dimension to this announcement that deserves clarification.

The official Edo State Judiciary website records the presentation of new vehicles to judges in June 2025.

Furthermore, the state’s published 2025 fourth-quarter budget implementation report contains provisions for the purchase of ten Toyota Corolla vehicles for judges, magistrates and customary court presidents, as well as five official cars, a bus and a pickup van.

The same report includes separate provisions for vehicles for High Court judges and pilot vehicles for the Chief Judge.

These are documented budget entries. They do not, by themselves, establish that every vehicle was purchased or delivered.

Nevertheless, they raise legitimate questions about the relationship between previous provisions, actual deliveries and the newly announced 33 vehicles.

How many judges received new vehicles in 2025?

How many vehicles are currently in the judiciary’s fleet?

What is the age and condition of those vehicles?

And how many of the proposed 33 vehicles are replacing vehicles purchased or delivered recently?

Surely, these are questions that can be answered without compromising judicial independence.

We have not been told the makes, models, specifications or total approved expenditure for these vehicles.

Without that information, the public cannot properly assess the financial implications of the proposal.

Are we discussing modest official vehicles, premium SUVs or a combination of different categories?

Will the purchase be undertaken through competitive procurement?

What will happen to the vehicles being replaced?

And, importantly, what is the total cost to Edo taxpayers?

The government may well have satisfactory answers to all these questions. Publishing them would help citizens assess whether the expenditure represents value for money.

When Vehicle Procurement Becomes a Public Policy Question
The broader issue is the priority accorded to official vehicles in government expenditure.

Citizens are entitled to ask how much Edo State has spent on vehicles across ministries, departments, agencies and other arms of government since November 2024.

They are equally entitled to compare that expenditure with investments in roads, schools, healthcare, public transportation and other essential services.

There is nothing inherently improper about purchasing official vehicles. Government officials require transportation to perform legitimate duties.

But procurement should be driven by demonstrable operational needs, transparent budgeting and measurable value for money.

A government’s commitment to public service is better understood through the results of its expenditure than through the number of vehicles it acquires.

The Edo State Judiciary also has an opportunity to clarify its position.

Was the proposed procurement initiated through its own budgetary and administrative processes?

Does it receive its constitutionally approved allocations directly and in full?

Does it exercise independent control over its capital expenditure?

These questions are not intended to diminish the dignity of the judiciary. On the contrary, they concern the institutional independence that allows judges to perform their duties without unnecessary dependence on another arm of government.

Judicial autonomy must be meaningful in practice, not merely impressive in constitutional language.

Governor Okpebholo’s announcement may represent a legitimate attempt to improve judicial welfare. It may also be consistent with an approved capital expenditure programme.

But the public has not yet been given sufficient information to make that assessment.

The State Government should therefore publish the approved cost, procurement arrangements, funding source and justification for the proposed 33 vehicles.

The judiciary, for its part, should clarify how the proposal fits within its financial autonomy and existing fleet requirements.

And perhaps the Edo State Government could provide a consolidated account of its vehicle procurement expenditure since the commencement of this administration.

Not because government officials should be denied official transportation, but because every naira of public expenditure deserves justification.

The fundamental issue is not whether judges deserve good vehicles. They do.

The issue is whether our constitutional institutions are being strengthened through transparent, independent and accountable financial administration.

If the judiciary is financially autonomous, why must the announcement of its vehicle purchases come as an executive promise during a courtesy visit?

Perhaps there is a perfectly reasonable explanation.

We would be delighted to hear it.

After all, we are only asking for a friend!